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The Deming Blog

FCPA: The Intent of Inducer Controls

From the perspective of the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions, when an inducer intends to cause an official to misuse his or her official position, it is not relevant whether the official has the capacity to influence an official decision. In determining whether an individual or entity may be subject to liability for a violation of the FCPA, the focus should be on the intent of the individual or entity making the inducement.

Under the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, culpability is determined by the intent of the person making the inducement as opposed to the official's action, inaction, or capacity.[1]  The payment or offer need not be accepted in order for there to be a violation.[2]  Nor does the intended beneficiary need to have the actual authority to make or influence the official decision.[3]  Even if the payment or offer was "intended to influence an official act that was lawful," there would still be a violation.[4]

Nor is it relevant under the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions whether inducements are made directly or indirectly to a foreign government official. Any evidence of intent to influence a foreign official may be sufficient to constitute a violation of the anti-bribery provisions.

For parties to the Organisation for Co-operation and Economic Development Convention of Combating the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Anti-Bribery Convention), the same principles apply.  Under Article 1 to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, parties to the Convention are required to make it a criminal offense for "any person to intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international business."


[1]Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 541.

[2]Id. (citing 1 L. Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions-Criminal, ¶ 16.01, Instr. 16-6 (2008)).

[3]Id.

[4]Id.

 

FCPA Compliance: Bona Fide Business Expenditures

From an FCPA compliance perspective, in determining what constitutes a bona fide business expenditure, a threshold determination needs to be made concerning whether a government official or unit of government can be paid or reimbursed for expenses that may be incurred.  In many countries, including the United States, limitations exist on what can be paid and, if so, how such payments are made.  Similarly, prior approval may also be required.

Care must be exercised in determining whether an expenditure is legitimate. Unnecessary diversions to resorts and travel upgrades to first class can be a cause for concern.   Expenditures for family members should always give rise to concern.  The analysis must be focused upon whether the expenditures in each situation are necessary business expenditures and, if so, whether what is paid is reasonable under the circumstances. An expenditure that is out of proportion or unrelated to a legitimate business purpose should serve as a basis for concern.

A variety of perspectives must be kept in mind when determining whether a bona fide expenditure is proper.   With the radical differences in living standards in various parts of the world, situations may arise where relatively modest expenditures can be viewed as improper inducements.  In those circumstances, there is a heightened need to be able to justify the legitimate basis for the expenditures that are made.  What might be viewed as customary practices in certain parts of the world are apt to be viewed as once-in-a-lifetime opportunities in other parts of the world.

Although not expressly required by the FCPA's anti-bribery provision, even good-faith offers to pay or reimburse reasonable expenses should be carefully documented and reviewed as part of an entity's compliance program.  The focus of any such determination is whether the expenditures are (1) reasonable in terms or purpose and amount; (2) made in good faith; and (3) relate directly to (a) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services or (b) the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign government or agency.

Whether the private sector is treated in the same way should not be a relevant consideration for what is reasonable.  Care needs to be exercised to ensure that practices deemed to be entirely appropriate for the private sector are not automatically extended to foreign officials.  For example, it may be an entity's practice to always fly prospective customers in first class as opposed to coach.  However, in certain contexts, an upgrade to first class could be perceived as sufficient to cause some foreign officials to be improperly influenced.  Even though it may be inconsistent with the normal way an entity treats potential customers, it may be necessary to have a different policy for foreign officials.

FCPA Compliance: Foreign Entities

From the perspective of FCPA compliance, foreign entities that are issuers can be fully subject to the same obligations of the FCPA's anti-bribery and accounting and record-keeping provisions as a U.S. entity that is an issuer.   An issuer is an entity that is required under the Securities Exchange Act to register under Section 12 or to file reports under Section 15(d).[1]  In general, publicly-held entities traded on a national exchange in the United States are issuers.  This can include the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ).

Issuers can include foreign entities,[2] including a foreign entity with American Depository Receipts (ADRs), which are registered pursuant to Section 12 or required to file reports pursuant to Section 15(d).  ADRs represent an ownership interest in the securities of a foreign private issuer, which are deposited, usually outside of the United States, with a financial institution as a depository. ADRs can be, and are, listed on a national securities exchange.

One of the most overlooked areas of compliance relates to foreign issuers and particularly foreign entities with ADRs listed in the United States.   The oversight in terms of compliance is not limited to the anti-bribery provisions.  It also extends to the accounting and record-keeping provisions.  In numerous cases, the status of foreign entities as issuers under the FCPA has been the basis for the Justice Department or SEC to take enforcement action.

 


[1]15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 780(d)(2012).

[2]In some circumstances, an exemption from this registration requirement may be available to a foreign private issuer, 15 U.S.C. § 78(g)(3) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) (2012). On October 10, 2008, the SEC amended 17 C.F.R. § 12g3-2(b) to exempt foreign private issuers whose securities are listed on markets in their home countries and not listed on a national securities exchange in the United States if they publish certain financial and business information in English on their web sites. SEC Release No. 34-58465.

 

FCPA Record-Keeping Provisions: Accounting Entries

Under the FCPA record-keeping provisions, the manner in which information is entered into an issuer's records becomes very important under Rule 13b2-1.[1]  As set forth in the FCPA's legislative history, "[t]he purpose of the [accounting and record-keeping provisions] is to strengthen the accuracy of the corporate books and records and the reliability of the audit process . . . ."[2]

Rule 13b2-1 provides that "[n]o person shall directly or indirectly, falsify or cause to be falsified, any book, record or account subject to Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act."[3]  Compliance with the record-keeping provisions is not limited to the accuracy of the record itself. Context and categorization can be equally important factors in determining a record's accuracy.

As pointed out in the FCPA's legislative history, "[u]nder the accounting section no off-the-books accounting fund could be lawfully maintained, either by a U.S. parent or by a foreign subsidiary, and no improper payment could be lawfully disguised."[4]  As a result, placing a transaction into an abnormal category or "burying" it in some other way may serve as a basis for an enforcement action for a violation of Rule 13b2-1 under the FCPA's record-keeping provisions.

Manipulating books or records to mask transactions by characterizing them in some oblique manner or actually falsifying a transaction can lead to serious exposure for an issuer and those individuals involved. At the same time, a record that may be limited in terms of the information provided may be adequate if properly categorized. Being recorded in a proper category may effectively fill in gaps and overcome concerns as to whether a transaction may be improperly disguised.


[1]17 C.F.R. § 240.13b1-2 (2012).

[2]S. Rep. No. 114 at 7, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098

[3]17 C.F.R. § 240.13b1-2.

[4]S. Rep. No. 114, supra note 2, at 11.

FCPA Compliance: Elements of a Compliance Program

One of the challenges of FCPA compliance is developing a framework that is sufficiently comprehensive to address the entire range of pertinent issues.  In this regard, one of the outcomes of the Justice Department's investigation of Deutsche Telekom AG and Magyar Telekom Plc. was a non-prosecution agreement with Deutsche Telekom.  It included an appendix laying out the particulars of an effective corporate compliance program.  

The appendix provides useful guidance for developing an FCPA compliance program.  A clear and concise list of critical components are identified and described.  They include:

  1. A clear corporate policy against violations of the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws.
  2. A system of financial and accounting procedures, including a system of internal accounting controls.
  3. Promulgation of compliance standards and procedures designed to reduce the prospect of violations that are made applicable to all directors and employees and, where necessary, outside parties acting on behalf of Deutsche Telekom in foreign jurisdictions, including agents, consultants, representatives, distributors, teaming partners and joint venture partners (collectively referred to as "agents and business partners").
  4. Assignment of responsibility to one or more senior officials for the implimentation and oversight of compliance with policies, standards and procedures regarding the FCPA and other applicable anti-corruption laws. Such officials shall have authority to report matters directly to Deutsche Telekom's Board of Management and Supervisory Board.
  5. Mechanisms designed to ensure that policies, standards and procedures are effectively communicated to all directors, employees, and where appropriate, agents and business partners.  The mechanisms shall include periodic training for all such directors, employees, agents, and business partners and annual certifications from the foregoing certifiying compliance with the training requirements.
  6. An effective system for reporting suspected criminal conduct and/or violations of the compliance policies, standards and procedures.
  7. Appropriate disciplinary procedures to address, among other things, violations of FCPA and other anti-corruption laws.
  8. Appropriate due diligence requirements pertaining to the retention and oversight of agents and business partners.
  9. Standard provisions in agreements, contracts, and renewals thereof with all agents and business partners which are designed to prevent violations of the FCPA and other applicable anti-corruption laws, which provisions may, depending upon the circumstances, include:  (A) anti-corruption representations and undertakings relating to compliance with the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws; (B) rights to conduct audits of the books and records of the agent or business partner to ensure compliance with the foregoing; and (C) rights to terminate an agent or business partner are a result of any violation of anti-corruptions laws, and regulations or representations and undertakings related to such matters.
  10. Periodic testing of the integrity code, and policies and procedures designed to evaluate their effectiveness in detecting and reducing violations of the anti-corruption laws and Deutsche Telekom's internal controls system and integrity.

Global Anti-Bribery Compliance: Japan

From the perspective of global anti-bribery compliance, international developments always need to be kept in mind. It does not matter whether an entity's compliance efforts are oriented to the FCPA, the UK Bribery Act, Canada's Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, or similar legal regimes.  There is a growing convergence in terms of the manner and means by which more and more countries are adopting and implementing similar legal regimes.

The convergence is largely a by-product of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Anti-Bribery Convention), the United Nations Convention against Corruption, the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, and the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption.  But particularly critical to the convergence taking place is the work of the OECD's Working Group on Bribery.

On January 12, 2012, the OECD Working Group issued its Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Japan. The report was critical of Japan's lack of enforcement of its implementing legislation. It called on Japan to increase its efforts to investigate and prosecute foreign bribery cases. In addition, it called on Japan to establish a legal basis for confiscating the proceeds of bribing foreign officials and to make it a crime to launder the proceeds of foreign bribery.

The OECD Working Group also called on Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), the ministry that has responsibility for Japan's foreign bribery offence, to take a stronger role in ensuring the effective implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.  In addition to promoting enhanced enforcement efforts, METI was also called on to take a more active role in encouraging the use of anti-compliance programs by Japanese companies.

Given the history of the OECD Working Group in pressing parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to take corrective measures, increased activity can be expected from Japan.  The degree to which increased activity can be anticipated remains to be seen.  However, METI is already in the process of seeking insights from U.S. and U.K. practitioners as well as the U.S. and U.K. subsidiaries of Japanese parent companies.

 

Global Anti-Bribery Compliance: UK Bribery Act Guidance

From the perspective of global anti-bribery compliance, practitioners, corporate counsel, consultants, and others are in constant need of insights as to how to meet the overlapping obligations under the UK Bribery Act, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, and the FCPA's internal control provisions relative to putting policies and procedures in place to prevent or deter the bribery of foreign officials as well as officials in the private sector. While the essence of each of these legal regimes is remarkably similar, there is always a constant and gnawing concern that some important consideration may have been overlooked.

Given the paucity of decisions interpreting these relatively new legal regimes, the pleadings and other papers filed in conjunction with the resolutions reached with the U.S. Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission can provide insights as to whether an entity's policies and procedures may be defective.  The guidance issued by the UK Secretary of State relative to meeting the requirements of section 7(2) of the UK Bribery Act can also be an extremely useful tool.  Its usefulness not only extends to entities seeking to comply with the UK Bribery Act, it also can be very useful for entities seeking to comply with both the anti-bribery and internal control provisions of the FCPA.

Another useful tool is the consultation containing the original draft of the guidance for complying with section 7(2) of the UK Bribery Act.   Though the original draft was not adopted and has little or no significance from a regulatory perspective, it nonetheless raises a number of issues that may be helpful in devising and developing a set of policies and procedures to deter the bribery of foreign officials as well as members of the private sector.

FCPA: Corrupt Intent

The FCPA's anti-bribery provisions differ from most other fraud statutes in that they require that the intent be corrupt.[1]  "Corrupt intent" is defined as "having an improper motive or purpose."[2]  The legislative history of the anti-bribery provisions makes clear that, like the domestic bribery statute,[3] the prohibited conduct occurs only when a payment or offer of payment is made to induce the intended beneficiary to in some way misuse his or her official position.

"Corruptly" as used in the anti-bribery provisions signifies "a bad or wrongful purpose and an intent to influence a foreign official to misuse his official position."[4]  "[A] person acts 'corruptly' if he or she acts with a 'bad purpose'."[5]  The thing of value must be given or offered with the intent to influence as opposed to be simply given whether or not the public official carries out his or her official duties.[6]

"Corrupt intent" as used within the context of the anti-bribery provisions derives from the domestic bribery statute.[7]  In the domestic context, "corrupt intent" requires a higher degree of intent than that required for violating the provisions prohibiting gratuities to public officials.[8]  It "incorporate[s] a concept of the bribe being the prime mover or producer of the official act."[9]  It is this element of quid pro quo that distinguishes the heightened criminal intent requisite under the bribery sections of the statute from the simple mens rea required for violations of the gratuity sections of the domestic bribery statute.[10]


[1]United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

[2]Id. (citing S. REP. No. 114, 9th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098). S.Rep. No. 114 provides:

The word "corruptly' is used in order to make clear that the offer, payment, promise, or gift, must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position in order to wrongfully direct business to the payor or his client, or to obtain preferential legislation or a favorable regulation. The word "corruptly" connotes an evil motive or purpose, an intent to wrong-fully influence the recipient. It does not require that the act be fully consummated, or succeed in producing the desired outcome.

[3]18 U.S.C. § 201 (2011).

[4]Schrieber, 327 F.3d 173, 183 (2d Cir. 2003).  As explained in United States v. Liebo, 923 F. 2d 1308, 1312 (8th Cir. 1991), '[a]n act is 'corruptly' done if done voluntarily and intentionally, and with a bad purpose of accomplishing either an unlawful end or result, or a lawful end or result by some unlawful method or means. The term 'corruptly' is intended to connote that the offer, payment, and promise was intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position." Cf. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 141 L. Ed. 2d 197 (1998) (approving a similar definitions of "willful").

[5]Schrieber, 327 F.3d at 182 (citing United States v. McElroy, 910 F.2d 1016, 1026 (2d Cir. 1990)).

[6]United States v. Strand, 574 F.2d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 1978) (distinguishing between intent required for bribery as opposed to an illegal gratuity in domestic bribery statute).

[7]Stichting Ter Behartiging Van de Velangen Van Ouddaandeelhouders In Het Kapitaal Van Saybolt Int'l B.V. v. Schreiber, 327 F.3d 173, 184 (2d Cir. 2003) 

[8]United States v. Hsieh Hui Mei Chen, 754 F.2d 817 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1139, 105 S. Ct. 2684, 86 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1985).

[9]United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 82 (1974).

[10]See id., 506 F.2d at 72; United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948, 96 S. Ct. 3167, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1184 (1976).

 

FCPA Compliance: Circumventing Internal Controls

One of the most interesting aspects of the recent indictment involving a number of former Siemens officials are the charges relating to conspiring to circumvent Siemens' internal controls. Except in extreme cases such as the information filed against Siemens in 2008 where violations of the internal control provisions were alleged, the adequacy of internal controls under the internal controls provisions of the FCPA can seldom be expected to serve as a basis for a criminal violation.

This result is largely due to the esoteric nature of the FCPA's internal control provisions. As the court stated in Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. World-Wide Coin Inv., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 751 (N.D. Ga. 1983), "[t]he main problem with the internal controls provision of the FCPA is that there are no specific standards by which to evaluate the sufficiency of controls; any evaluation is inevitably a highly subjective process in which knowledgeable individuals can arrive at totally different conclusions."

The information filed against Siemens in 2008, in effect, alleged a violation of the internal control provisions of the FCPA by knowingly failing to implement and circumventing a system of adequate internal controls.[1]  The recent indictment against the Siemens executives focuses on circumventing internal controls and makes no reference to implementing adequate internal controls.[2]

From a policy perspective, such a focus represents a positive development since it provides a mechanism for enforcement officials to direct their attention to individuals who actively seek to undermine an entity's efforts to deter improper conduct on the part of those acting on its behalf. From a trial standpoint, a challenge is presented in clearly establishing what controls the individuals charged sought to circumvent.


[1]United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, Case No. CR 08-367 B/L, Information at ¶ 135 (D.D.C., filed Dec. 12, 2008).

[2]United States v. Sharef, Case No. 1-11-cr-01056, Indictment at ¶ 57 (S.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 12, 2011).

 

Global Anti-Bribery Compliance: Offers and Promises

In terms of global anti-bribery compliance, whether the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, the UK Bribery Act, or the provisions of one of the other anti-bribery statutes now being enforced are involved, it is not critical that a payment is actually made.  In addition, a bribe need not actually be received, and the object of the bribe need not be actually attainable.[1]  Indeed, the public official need not accept the bribe for there to be a violation.[2]  All that is required is that what is paid, offered, or promised be sufficient to form the basis for an improper inducement.

For any party to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention or the United Nations Convention against Corruption, any offer or promise that could reasonably be believed to be an improper inducement falls within the category of prohibited conduct.  For this reason, in implementing a compliance program and accompanying internal accounting controls, a challenge is presented in attempting to deter and prohibit improper inducements that are intangible in nature.  Though imperfect, various forms of controls can be devised to monitor and deter improper payments.  But given their intangible nature, controlling and deterring what may be offered or promised poses a particular challenge.

Ultimately, due diligence associated with the individuals and entities involved may be the most important factor in controlling what may be offered or promised.  Yet regardless of what methods and means are devised to deter improper inducements, great care needs to be exercised to address the prospect of improper offers or promises in implementing an FCPA, UK Bribery Act, or global anti-bribery compliance program.  The focus should not be limited to improper payments.

 


[1]See, e.g., United States v. Jacobs, 431 F.2d 754, 759-60 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950, 91 S. Ct., 1613, 1634, 29 L. Ed. 2d 120, reh'g denied, 403 U.S. 912, 91 S. Ct. 2210, 29 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1971) ("Section 206(b) is violated even though the official offered a bribe is not corrupted, or the object of the bribe could not be attained, or it could make no difference if after the act were done it turned out that there had been actually no occasion to seek to influence any official conduct"); United States v. Troop, 235 F. 2d 123, 125 (7th Cir. 1956) ("[I]t is entirely immaterial that for some reason, subsequently determined, the Officer could not have brought about the result desired by the person offering the bribe.").

[2]Jacobs, 431 F.2d. at 760.

 


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